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INTRODUCTION
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq's Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI's ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI's decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe-haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI's resurrection.
Conversely, al-Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al-Qa`ida's operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq.
Section I of this paper traces al-Qa`ida in Iraq's transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq's Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures-from U.S. forces and tribal sources-exacerbated AQI's fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI's prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI's failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI's demise to other elements.
I. STRATEGIC OVERREACH AND SUNNI REJECTION
Al-Qa`ida and Secular Resistance
On Much of the tension resulted from AQI imposing its will in traditionally tribal areas. 3 Nevertheless, the shared interest in expelling the United States and resisting Shi'a political control compelled most tribal leaders and nationalists to tolerate AQI's indiscretions. AQI was brutal and imperious, but its successful attacks against U.S.
forces, Shi'a militias, and the Iraqi government were useful. Zarqawi's attacks on U.S.
troops and the Iraqi government were welcomed by other Sunni insurgents, even as many were appalled by the mass slaughter of innocent Iraqis and angered by attacks on members of their own group.
Strategically, however, AQI's threat to the Sunni nationalists was clear from early 2004.
Zarqawi's strategy was fundamentally designed to assert control over Sunni groups and replace tribal loyalty and Iraqi nationalism with an ideological commitment to jihadi-salafi ideological goals. Murdering Shi'a was just the means to Zarqawi's end. He hoped to create a sectarian crisis gigantic enough to demonstrate that only jihadist extremism and brutality could keep Sunnis safe. Total sectarian war was to be the justification necessary to convert Sunnis to AQI's absolutist ideology.
The February 2006 bombing of the Askariya mosque in Samarra unleashed the brutal sectarian war AQI had sought since its founding. Shi'a militias, some operating from inside Iraqi government agencies, attacked Sunni communities across Iraq. Despite this operational success, AQI was unable to capitalize on the sectarian violence to radicalize Iraq's Sunni population. Despite its ability to mount destabilizing attacks across much of Iraq, AQI did not have the manpower, expertise, or predilection to safeguard Sunni populations as they demanded. Unable to protect the Sunni population from Shi'a retribution, AQI was blamed for the violence being perpetrated by Shi'a groups against Sunnis. AQI's violence was not nihilistic; rather it had an image of the society it hoped to create. AQI's strategic sin was arrogance; the jihadist group had the power to tear society apart but was not strong enough to pull it back together again in its own image. The IAI was not the only group tending a delicate relationship with al-Qa`ida. Tribal groups in Anbar were angry with AQI's zealous ideology, intrusion on their traditional smuggling routes, and determination to uproot traditional tribal political structures. 5
These tribal groups overlapped with many of the insurgent organizations in Iraq. In some cases, self-described insurgent groups with names plastered across the internet were simply the public face for essentially tribal behavior. Other letters seem to indicate that AQI and Ansar al-Sunnah had been in discussions about joining al-Qa`ida's ISI, which is reasonable considering AQI's determination to Meanwhile, as Sunni groups began to confront AQI more directly, they began to see the United States and Iraqi government as useful partners. In the West, this movement was often interpreted as the United States-allied Sons of Iraq (SOI) movement finally taking on al-Qa`ida, but Sunni insurgent groups described the fight against AQI differentlyeither as tribes reasserting their authority or a function of intra-insurgent warfare. For these former insurgents, the SOI was a way to get paid for a fight that was already ongoing against AQI.
Worse, AQI's failures were terribly transparent. Even as would-be allies with deep links to the people of western Iraq turned against AQI, the group made ever more ostentatious demands that others submit to its will. Such bold, unrealistic propagandizing had worked for jihadists in the past, but Iraq was different because AQI was not the only armed group with a media wing and a website. Iraq's tribes had internet campaigns as well, not to mention easier access to Arab satellite television media than did their jihadist counterparts. Not only was AQI starting to lose ground on the physical battlefield in Iraq, it was losing ground on the global media battlefield as well.
SECTION II: THE INSURGENT WAR
Strategic Disconnect
The friction between AQI and its nationalist and tribal counterparts remained largely The ISI commander's rationale for the violence-accurate, exaggerated, or fabricated-illustrates the complexity of political and military relations in Iraq.
According to the local commander, the ISI had assassinated a leader of the Rabii tribe and sixty-five other people for working with the Iraqi government. 30 The Rabii tribe was closely connected with JM, particularly after the tribe's emir became JM's chief Sharia advisor. The Rabiis used JM to demand retribution from the ISI and set up roadblocks to capture ISI members. Afterward, the ISI ordered a curfew and established a "court date" to resolve the issue. According to the local commander, JM attacked the ISI instead of resolving the problem through negotiation and lost twelve of its members. 31 The disconnect between public statements and ISI actions also suggests that the ISI's leadership did not fully comprehend the nature of the Sunni backlash against them.
There are several explanations for these problems. First, the U.S. and tribal net was tightening around ISI fighters, which must have made clear communication much more difficult. The mere fact that internal ISI documents from this period are now in U.S. databases rather than al-Qa`ida hands is testament to that fact. Second, Abu
Ayyub al-Masri had a more conservative leadership style than his predecessor Abu
Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who had a famously hands-on approach to his organization and was a constant presence in the media. In early 2008, the Qatari newspaper Al-Arab conducted an interview with Abu Turab al-Jaza'iri, the Algerian leader of the ISI in Samarra in which he explained why the ISI was losing support and seemed to blame the group's current leadership:
[Al-Jazaʹiri] …I prefer not to go into it, but I can tell you that several mistakes were made in those areas by our members there that led to that situation, which 
Al-Qa`ida's Goals
AQI's problems are particularly interesting and important because of the nature of the Islamic State of Iraq and its stated purpose. Al-Qa`ida's ideology is often described as almost nihilistic or anarchic, but in Iraq AQI demonstrated a clear intent to transition into a group capable of governing-which would require a modicum of bureaucratic efficiency. 51 Like al-Qa`ida's broader goals, true governance was unachievable, but it illustrates the importance of understanding alQa`ida's real objectives.
The lesson for U.S. strategists is to avoid mistaking the United States' inability to achieve its goals as evidence that al-Qa`ida is achieving its own. Al-Qa`ida's senior leaders do not want to be a permanent opposition movement. Their purpose is not just to kill Americans; that is a means to an end. Al-Qa`ida terrorists did not declare the ISI solely to disrupt the U.S. mission in Iraq, but rather because they wanted to graduate from terrorist organization to political establishment. Al-Qa`ida has a vision for the future, albeit one that very few people want them to achieve. This is an important ontological concept. Failure to acknowledge al-Qa`ida's substantive goals leads to an inability to understand its failures, or capitalize on them. Iraqi insurgents, including AQI, were considered "dead-enders" and were generally portrayed as simply disruptive forces in Iraq rather than groups competing to impose their own vision of governance. Certainly, AQI's particularly brutal violence alienated tribal leaders, but it was only after Iraqi tribal leaders recognized that U.S. failure and withdrawal might mean AQI governance that they turned on the group. Similarly, U.S. commanders had to carefully assess the 51 Fishman (2007).
strategic intent of Sunni insurgents in Iraq to discern that not all were as irreconcilable as al-Qa`ida, despite their attacks on U.S. troops.
Understanding al-Qa`ida's goals in its own terms is important, in part because that understanding is critical to determining who should not be considered al-Qa`ida.
There are many dangerous people in the world willing to kill to achieve their goals, but not all of them are al-Qa`ida and not all of them are implacably hostile.
SECTION III: THE LEGACY AND FUTURE OF AQI
AQI no longer controls territory and cannot threaten the fundamental integrity of the Iraqi state. Its capacity to inflict violence has been dramatically curtailed and is unlikely to be regained. Nonetheless, AQI remains an important terrorist actor inside Iraq and will remain a critical part of al-Qa`ida's global political and logistics network. Under the right conditions, AQI could even make a limited comeback, though the group's ability to produce that situation on its own is limited. AQI will have to hope that political conditions evolve to exclude and frustrate Iraq's Sunnis and thereby create social space for extremism. AQI no longer commands its own destiny. The group is most likely to struggle along as a deadly fringe group rather than a catalyst for dramatic social change or a serious threat to the political status quo. At the same time, however, AQI is likely to remain an important piece of alQa`ida's global operation. The foreign fighter networks that serviced AQI will likely be redirected to support other jihads and AQI will retain enough operational capability to support a continued media campaign.
Iraqi Elections and Al-Qa`ida
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq's hopes for returning to prominence depend on whether or not Iraq's Sunnis continue to be politically isolated. The successful January 2009 provincial election suggests that total breakdown of the Iraqi political system is increasingly unlikely. Even in Anbar, where the process was initially disputed, there has been only limited violence tied to the election. In Mosul, Arab victories over Kurds will likely stabilize the region and weaken social support for AQI. Overall, the election was a success.
Nonetheless, accusations of vote rigging and the immaturity of new Sunni political parties highlight the internal tensions, and inherent fragility, of a new democracy.
Iraqi politics are likely to be marred by violence for the foreseeable future. The upcoming national elections scheduled for December 2009 will be an even more critical test than the January election, and the fractious Iraqi political environment still contains potential spoilers that could contribute to social and political turmoil that might offer AQI a path back to prominence.
AQI will try to use violence to disrupt Sunni integration into the Iraqi political system.
The group is too weak to violently disrupt political participation on a wide scale, but is likely to use isolated violence as a means to threaten the wider population. Rather than attempting to depress Sunni turnout, AQI will likely try to incite sectarian fears so that Meanwhile, high expectations among Sunni tribal leaders, even those that honestly embrace a pluralistic Iraqi political system, may be unrealistic. Sunni tribal leaders are extremely unlikely to control Iraq's government even if they participate fully, which may ultimately induce resentment among leaders used to getting their way. This is particularly worrisome in the next few elections, because nascent Sunni political parties are poorly organized and unaccustomed to electoral politics, both of which will limit their prospects for electoral success.
Iraq's greatest challenges no longer involve al-Qa`ida, rather they are more traditional disputes over resources, budgets, power, and autonomy-ultimately was ultimately used against AQI by local insurgent organizations. This dynamic creates both opportunities and dangers for al-Qa`ida. The ability of local groups to operate effectively online creates opportunities to empower allies, but it also means that AQI is no longer the only militant group speaking to a global audience. That is critical because jihadists have long been able to tell the story of jihad even when they had minimal battlefield impact. The plurality of propaganda weakens al-Qa`ida's storytelling ability, and that undermines al-Qa`ida's overall message of transnational struggle.
SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Though dramatically weakened, AQI will impact the future of Iraq and will play a role in al-Qa`ida's global campaign. There are many lessons to be learned from AQI's decline that are relevant to both the fight against AQI in Iraq and the fight against al-Qa`ida operations elsewhere. The recommendations below not only seek to illuminate opportunities to weaken AQI in Iraq, but also to target other al-Qa`ida elements. Al-Qa`ida will learn lessons from Iraq to apply elsewhere; the United
States should as well. However, it is dangerous to apply lessons from Iraq to fights against al-Qa`ida elsewhere without considering the context and the unique dynamics of the local organization. Cultural and political environments set the parameters for both U.S. goals and the tools that can be used effectively to achieve those goals. Furthermore, AQI was not a prototypical al-Qa`ida franchise; in general it was far more ambitious than other al-Qa`ida cells. Whereas AQI tried to create and dominate a new political system, most al-Qa`ida franchises are better at shaping society and learning to work within established political and tribal systems.
Apply the Right Lessons and Set the Right Expectations in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Many of the dynamics that undermined AQI will have less of an impact in Afghanistan-which will make al-Qa`ida there much more durable. First, and most importantly, the group has a relative safe-haven in Pakistan and has been embedding itself into the social fabric there for twenty years. Second, al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan seems content to allow its partners-friendly Taliban and tribal groups-to take leading roles. Third, al-Qa`ida has generally eschewed mass casualty attacks against non-combatants in the region. The slower operational pace not only creates better training opportunities, it means that local leaders make fewer critical operational decisions under pressure, reducing the opportunity for mistakes. Moreover, whereas AQI's ambitions tended to grow in lockstep with its power-which inhibited the development of a dependable strategic reserve-al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is more careful to harbor resources. AQI always fought a "total"
war that demanded absolute exertion, thereby constraining its ability to flex when pressured. Al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is much more capable of reallocating resources and responding to "surges" in U.S., Afghan, or Pakistani pressure. 
Target AQI's Indoctrination Process
Al-Qa`ida's struggle to produce cohesive-and durable-command and control mechanisms illustrates the importance of ideological and strategic training to its success. Without clear, focused ideological training, AQI commanders were prone to mistakes that tended to be excessively violent, and thereby alienated local populations. There is no doubt that al-Qa`ida's core ideas justify extreme violence, but those concepts are even more brutal when they are understood superficially.
Sophisticated al-Qa`ida leaders, like those in Pakistan, understand that patience is critical and that short-run ideological compromises are sometimes necessary; poorly trained commanders generally do not and trend toward extreme violence in the name of ideological purity. Strikes against al-Qa`ida training centers are always valuable because they directly undermine the movement's ability to disseminate ideas, but they are particularly important in difficult operational environments in which al-Qa`ida is prone to operational mistakes.
Capitalize on Superior State Resources to Pressure Al-Qa`ida across its Networks
Because al-Qa`ida's internal systems are mutually reinforcing, sometimes in unpredictable ways, it is important to target many simultaneously. For example, targeting al-Qa`ida leadership nodes is less valuable if al-Qa`ida can effectively train new leaders and communicate steady guidance from senior commanders to new operational leaders. Isolated acts against specific functions and systems in alQa`ida's network, even if they are forceful and effective, are unlikely to achieve strategic impact. Coordinated action is critical.
Despite al-Qa`ida's wide reach and impressive capabilities, it remains a sub-state actor with limited resources. It is worth remembering that AQI's successes occurred as it fought a "total" war while the U.S. fought a "limited" one. The United States had the ability to "surge" resources of all sorts-troops, focus, and strategic creativity-and when it did AQI could not match the new approach. The resource discrepancy also meant that the United States and its allies could pressure AQI for a sustained time period in multiple arenas simultaneously-punishing them tactically, undermining their social support, striking leadership targets, undermining financing, and disrupting media operations. Such an approach is more damaging to al-Qa`ida franchises than strategies that sequentially prioritize specific systems of an al-Qa`ida operation.
Emphasize Realistic Political Expectations for All Parties in Iraq
Although a success in general, the January 2009 election in Iraq illustrates the dangers of electoral processes in an incomplete and fragile democracy. As the Iraqi electoral process matures, the United States should project realistic expectations for political parties, particularly those in the opposition. Democracy depends on the willingness of parties to lose peacefully.
Tell AQI's Story Honestly and Comprehensively
Al-Qa`ida's pretension to political leadership is its own worst enemy. Rather than minimize al-Qa`ida's aspirations or characterize them in relationship to U.S. goals, the United States is well-advised to treat them as honestly and directly as possible.
Instead of reciting bromides about what al-Qa`ida wants to destroy, the United
States should spend more time describing what al-Qa`ida wants to build: a religious dictatorship that squashes local customs and power structures, suffers no dissent, and imposes its will by brutally killing those who oppose it. Truth is the first casualty of war, and it is sometimes inconvenient to U.S. short-term interests, but it is al-Qa`ida's worst enemy.
American commentators tend to exaggerate the central role of U.S. troops in destroying AQI. This is a mistake. U.S. troops did play an important role destroying AQI. Nonetheless, the story of AQI's demise is more practical and mundane than usually described, and it is mostly the story of local tribes getting fed up with outsiders dictating to them. U.S. troops did exactly what they should do in such circumstances; they facilitated AQI's decline by killing and capturing key leadership, disrupting communications and logistics processes, and giving the local tribes a legitimate path to political participation. But it was the rejection of AQI by local Sunnis that discredited and degraded the organization. Their concerns were both profound and banal: ranging from anger over AQI's ideological extremism to frustration that AQI monopolized local smuggling networks. Most importantly, the truthful story of local Sunnis rejecting al-Qa`ida is far more valuable to the United
States in its long-term fight against jihadists than the immediate benefits gained by claiming an American victory over AQI.
Enable anti-al-Qa`ida Insurgents to Compete with al-Qa`ida's Media Operations
Iraqi Sunnis' Internet presence dramatically damaged not just AQI, but the larger alQa`ida network that was invested in AQI's success. By illustrating AQI's ideological and practical failings, these insurgents undermined al-Qa`ida's core arguments to be defending true Muslims everywhere. The United States should acknowledge that insurgents, even those fighting U.S. troops, are potentially useful in the larger fight against al-Qa`ida because their interests diverge dramatically from global jihadists.
In regions where the United States is unlikely to completely destroy al-Qa`ida, it is important to bolster the ability of competing groups to compete with al-Qa`ida on all levels, not just on the physical battlefield.
Identify Why U.S. Foes are Fighting
In insurgent environments, the United States should endeavor to understand its enemies' motivations, rather than judge opponents based on their tactics. AQI and tribal insurgents used very similar tactics against the United States-and for years these similarities prevented the United States from recognizing that the tribal insurgents' interests diverged dramatically from AQI's. U.S. commanders and policymakers should aim to understand the ends their opponents seek-and judge policy on that basis-rather than just the tactics they use to achieve those ends.
